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A EUROPEAN SOLUTION TO THE 
REGULATION OF CROSS-BORDER MARKETS 
Eric J. Pan* 
INTRODUCTION 
An extraordinary change took place when the New York Stock 
Exchange (NYSE) acquired the electronic trading platform operator 
Archipelago and went public as a $10 billion company. The NYSE’s initial 
public offering marked the end of the NYSE’s comfortable 213-year history 
as a non-profit, member-owned enterprise and the beginning of a new 
period of expansion and growth into new markets. As a public company, 
the NYSE took on the burden of having to pursue profits and please 
shareholders in return for access to capital—capital it could use to invest in 
technology and pursue mergers and acquisitions.1 In acquiring Archipelago, 
the NYSE obtained an advanced electronic trading platform that would 
enable it to offer, for the first time, the option to execute trades on the 
exchange electronically,2 diminishing the importance of the NYSE’s 
traditional trading floor.3 
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 1. For a discussion of the reasons exchanges have sought to demutualize, see Caroline 
Bradley, Demutualization of Financial Exchanges: Business as Usual?, 21 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 
657, 668–72 (2001). See also Roberta S. Karmel, Turning Seats Into Shares: Causes and 
Implications of Demutualization of Stock and Futures Exchanges, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 367, 368 
(2002) (discussing demutualization as a response to increased trading volume, technological 
advancements, and competition). 
 2. Under the NYSE’s “hybrid” system, trades may be executed either through specialists on 
the trading floor or through an automated matching system. New York Stock Exchange, Products 
& Services: NYSE Equities, http://www.nyse.com/productservices/nyseequities/ 
1166830723427.html (last visited Nov. 12, 2007).  The first test of the hybrid system took place 
on October 6, 2006 when the NYSE removed automated-trading limits on shares of American 
Express Co. and Equity Office Properties Trust. On the first day, the response time of the 
exchange decreased from an average of 9 seconds to 0.3 seconds, and electronic trading 
represented 97% of the trading volume of American Express and 95% of Equity Office. Gaston F. 
Ceron, NYSE’s Speed Test Starts Off Well, WALL ST. J., Oct. 9, 2006, at C2. 
 3. See Aaron Lucchetti, Boos vs. Moos: NYSE Deal Gets One or the Other, WALL ST. J., Apr. 
6, 2007, at A1; Aaron Lucchetti, The NYSE: Faster (and Lonelier), WALL ST. J., Jan. 24, 2007, at 
C1; Michael J. de la Merced, Big Board, Moving Toward Electronic Trading, to Lay Off 500, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 9, 2006, at C3. When the London Stock Exchange (LSE) first introduced electronic 
trading as an alternative to its floor trading system in 1986, the LSE trading floor closed within a 
few weeks. See NORMAN S. POSER, INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES REGULATION 45–46 (Little, 
Brown & Company ed., 1991). 
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The move to electronic trading has some symbolic implications. Often 
the scene of frenetic traders swarming from one specialist station to another, 
the NYSE trading floor has been a highly visible symbol of the strength and 
vibrancy of the U.S. capital markets, making it a popular destination for 
foreign heads of state, corporate chiefs and A-list celebrities who seek the 
honor of ringing the NYSE’s opening and closing bell.4 But beyond 
symbolism, allowing customer orders to move to the Archipelago platform 
and away from the trading floor was an acknowledgement by the NYSE 
that providing for faster and more efficient electronic trading is now 
necessary to compete against exchanges and alternative trading systems 
(ATSs) in the United States and Europe. 
This competitive pressure has been building for years as other 
exchanges invested heavily in electronic trading technology.5 In 2001, The 
Nasdaq Stock Market (Nasdaq) became a public company, and, in 2005, it 
acquired the trading business of Instinet, an operator of an advanced 
electronic trading platform and a major competitor of Archipelago.6 
Regional exchanges, like Philadelphia, Boston and Chicago abandoned 
floor trading several years earlier. Several brokerage firms have purchased 
ownership stakes in these regional exchanges or have set up electronic 
networks to internalize orders.7 These same firms and others also have 
launched trading services, such as Liquidnet Inc., Investment Technology 
Group Inc. and Pipeline Trading Centers LLC, to provide alternative 
trading venues for large block trades.8 
Compared to their counterparts in Europe, however, the U.S. exchanges 
have been playing a game of catch-up. Since the United Kingdom’s “Big 
Bang”9 reforms in 1986, all major European exchanges have demutualized, 
                                                                                                                 
 4. See Sunando Sengupta, The Trading Bell at the New York Stock Exchange (Jan. 2006) 
(unpublished article), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=876620 (noting that having company 
executives ring the opening or closing bell has little impact on a company’s share price). 
 5. See Hans R. Stoll, Electronic Trading in Stock Markets, 20 J. ECON. PERSP. 153, 153 
(2006). 
 6. See Jenny Anderson, Nasdaq to Acquire Electronic Stock Trader, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 
2005, at C1. 
 7. In September 2006, Citigroup, Credit Suisse, Bear Stearns, Merrill Lynch, Bloomberg and 
Knight Capital purchased over 50% of the National Stock Exchange. In June, Bank of America, 
Bear Stearns, E*Trade Financial and Goldman Sachs made a combined $20 million equity 
investment in the Chicago Stock Exchange. And in 2005, Morgan Stanley, Citigroup, UBS, Credit 
Suisse, Merrill Lynch and Citadel Derivatives each acquired minority stakes in the Philadelphia 
Stock Exchange. Merrill Lynch, Lehman Brothers, Credit Suisse and Morgan Stanley are also 
investors in BATS, the third-largest trading center in terms of trading volume after the NYSE and 
Nasdaq. See Nasdaq’s Nemesis, THE ECONOMIST, Mar. 17, 2007, at 74. 
 8. See Aaron Lucchetti, Wall Street Plays the Markets, WALL ST. J., Aug. 30, 2006, at C1; 
Aaron Lucchetti, Wall Street Firms Plan New Service for Block Trades, WALL ST. J., Sep. 27, 
2006, at C4. The NYSE recently announced a new venture to specialize in the handling of block 
trades. Aaron Lucchetti, Shhh, NYSE Aims to Bring Back Blocks, WALL ST. J., Oct. 30, 2007, at 
C3. 
 9. Capital City, THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 21, 2006, at 83. 
2007]A European Solution to the Regulation of Cross-Border Markets 135 
 
consolidated and introduced electronic trading technology. In 1993, the 
Stockholm Stock Exchange was the first European exchange to 
demutualize. Helsinki followed Stockholm in 1995, Copenhagen in 1996, 
Amsterdam and Borse Italiana in 1997, Athens in 1999, and London, 
Deutsche Börse (Frankfurt) and Euronext (Amsterdam, Brussels and Paris) 
in 2000.10 
At the same time, the European exchanges have been competing for 
cross-border listings, spurring efforts to attract order flow by developing 
faster and more efficient electronic trading systems.11 In 1986, the Paris 
Bourse introduced Cotation Assistée en Continu (CAC), and the London 
Stock Exchange (LSE) introduced its Stock Exchange Automated 
Quotations System (SEAQ). Since then, European exchanges have 
competed for listings and trading volume by developing more advanced 
trading systems that are designed to lower trading costs and increase the 
speed of order matching and execution. For example, when the LSE 
introduced SEAQ International, an automated quotation system for 
international stocks, and threatened to attract a substantial portion of the 
trading volume of German company shares, the Deutsche Börse countered 
with Xetra.12 When other European exchanges appeared to draw away 
business from the LSE, the LSE introduced the Stock Exchange Electronic 
Trading System (SETS) for its Main Market in 1997.13 
The competition for faster and more efficient trading platforms 
continues today, especially as hedge funds and other institutional investors 
use fast-trading computer programs to take advantage of arbitrage 
opportunities.14 In 2007, the LSE announced its new trading platform 
TradElect.15 TradElect shortens the amount of time to complete a trade to 
ten milliseconds; this is five times faster than with SETS.16 Competing on 
the basis of convenience instead of speed, OMX introduced “Genium,” one 
                                                                                                                 
 10. See Reena Aggarwal, Demutualization and Corporate Governance of Stock Exchanges, 15 
J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 105, 105–06 (2002). Several non-European exchanges also demutualized: 
the Australian Stock Exchange in 1998 and Singapore, Hong Kong and Toronto in 2000. The first 
U.S. market to demutualize was Nasdaq in 2000. Id. 
 11. See Norman S. Poser, The Stock Exchanges of the United States and Europe: Automation, 
Globalization, and Consolidation, 22 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 497 (2001). 
 12. See Cara Schwarz-Schilling & Mark Wahrenburg, Regulating Competition Between Stock 
Exchanges 2 (Universitat Frankfurt Am Main, Working Paper, 2002), available at http://wiw.uni-
frankfurt.de/schwerpunkte/finance/wp/354.pdf; Marco Pagano, The Changing Microstructure of 
European Equity Markets (Ctr. for Studies in Econ. & Fin., Working Paper No. 4, 1997), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=141048. 
 13. See Poser, supra note 11, at 523. 
 14. See Norma Cohen, Headlong Scramble for Speed, FIN. TIMES REP., Nov. 28, 2006, at 4. 
 15. See Alistair MacDonald, LSE Puts Its Stock in Speed, WALL ST. J., June 19, 2007, at C2. 
 16. Id. 
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of the few trading platforms that can receive orders for securities, 
commodities and derivatives.17 
Demutualization and increased competition has led to a wave of 
consolidation by the European exchanges. Euronext joined together the 
Amsterdam, Brussels, Paris and Lisbon exchanges where companies listed 
on each exchange are traded across the same order book. OMX has gone the 
furthest, bringing together the Copenhagen, Stockholm, Helsinki, Iceland, 
Riga, Tallinn and Vilnius exchanges into a single exchange with uniform 
listing rules.18 The LSE acquired Borse Italiana.19 And both Euronext and 
Deutsche Börse have attempted, albeit unsuccessfully, to merge with the 
LSE.20 
Until recently, the U.S. and European markets developed independently 
of each other. Competition among exchanges and from ATSs, as well as 
regulatory reforms in each jurisdiction, has driven many of the changes that 
have taken place. This separation of the U.S. and European markets, 
however, is ending as both the NYSE and Nasdaq acquire major non-U.S. 
exchanges. In April 2007, the NYSE and Euronext merged into a single 
cross-border entity, named NYSE Euronext, to operate exchanges in Europe 
and the United States. Nasdaq, reviving its own international aspirations,21 
announced in May 2007 that it plans to acquire OMX.22 The existence of 
one, and likely two, transatlantic exchanges is putting pressure on Deutsche 
Börse and other European exchanges to seek new partners.23 
The merger of the two largest U.S. exchanges with European exchanges 
(and possibly additional mergers with exchanges in other parts of the 
                                                                                                                 
 17. Id. 
 18. See generally Alistair MacDonald, Multiple Markets, One Listing, WALL ST. J., Oct. 3, 
2006, at C14; OMX Corporate, http://www.omxgroup.com (last visited Nov. 12, 2007). 
 19. Alistair MacDonald, LSE Snags Borsa Italiana, Beating Out NYSE Euronext, WALL ST. J., 
June 23, 2007, at B3. 
 20. Alistair MacDonald, For LSE Chief Furse, Takeover-Fighting Skills Could Be Put to the 
Test, WALL ST. J., Sept. 21, 2007, at C1. 
 21. In 2000, Nasdaq entered into a joint venture with the Osaka Stock Exchange to form 
Nasdaq Japan, and in 2001 Nasdaq acquired Brussels-based exchange Easdaq, renaming it Nasdaq 
Europe. Both ventures ultimately failed.  See Silvia Ascarelli, Nasdaq Confirms its Acquisition of 
Easdaq Stake, WALL ST. J., Mar. 28, 2001, at C14; Terzah Ewing & Phred Dvorak, Japan Gets 
First Taste of Nasdaq in Latest Push for Global Market, WALL ST. J., June 20, 2000, at A21; 
German Offshoot of Nasdaq Plans to End Operations, WALL ST. J., Aug. 13, 2003, at C10. 
 22. See Aaron Lucchetti & Alistair MacDonald, Nasdaq Lands OMX for $3.7 Billion; Are 
More Merger Deals on the Way?, WALL ST. J., May 26, 2007, at B3. Nasdaq also attempted 
unsuccessfully to acquire the LSE in February 2007, but may make another attempt in the future. 
As of June 2007, Nasdaq owned 30 percent of the LSE, enough to deter a competing bid and to 
make another serious takeover attempt for the London market. See Alistair MacDonald & Jenny 
Clevstrom, Moving the Market: Nasdaq, Nordic Exchange Holding Talks - Consolidation Fever 
Revives Speculation of a Joint LSE Bid, WALL ST. J., Apr. 13, 2007, at C2. 
 23. See Buy, buy, buy, THE ECONOMIST, May 24, 2007, at 76. 
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world)24 poses a problem for U.S. regulators: How should a multi-
jurisdictional exchange be regulated?25 The U.S. regulatory regime tightly 
controls how exchanges operate, who can conduct business on the 
exchanges and what are the responsibilities of exchanges to regulate market 
participants. Unique to the U.S. system, these regulations cannot easily be 
extended to non-U.S. exchanges. Furthermore, European governments have 
shown hostility to any prospect of the U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) applying its regulations to the European half of a 
transatlantic exchange.26 
To win approval for their merger, the NYSE and Euronext announced 
that they would keep their markets separate, each to be regulated only by its 
respective home regulator,27 but it is unlikely NYSE Euronext will be 
satisfied with this arrangement. The utmost economic benefits of the merger 
will be realized only if the exchanges are able to consolidate trading into 
one platform with a single order book, thereby achieving economies of 
scale and maximizing liquidity. To complete such a consolidation would 
require unhindered cross-border trading, where broker-dealers in the United 
States and Europe would have full access to listed shares in each market. 
Currently, the United States prevents a foreign exchange from 
providing services in the United States without registering as an exchange 
or meeting certain limited registration exemptions set forth by the SEC. 
Foreign broker-dealers also cannot provide services in the United States 
without meeting applicable U.S. broker-dealer regulations.28 These 
limitations are the result of the SEC’s unwillingness to provide greater 
flexibility in a regulatory system it believes best provides for investor 
protection and market integrity.29 In this respect, U.S. regulation conflicts 
                                                                                                                 
 24. See James Kanter, Trans-Atlantic Exchange to Be Listed Today, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 4, 2007, 
at C2 (reporting that NYSE Euronext chief executive officer John Thain announced plans to 
expand operations to Asia). 
 25. See Ethiopis Tafara & Robert J. Peterson, A Blueprint for Cross-Border Access to U.S. 
Investors: A New International Framework, 48 HARV. INT’L L.J. 31 (2007). 
 26. See, e.g., Alistair MacDonald, UK Frets Over LSE Takeover, WALL ST. J., Sept. 14, 2006, 
at C12. See also Charlie McCreevy, EU Comm’r for Internal Mkt. & Serv., Public Address at The 
Heyman Center for Corporate Goverance: Building the Transatlantic Marketplace (Mar. 7, 2007), 
available at http://www.heyman-center.org/programs/mccreevy%20speech.pdf. 
 27. See Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change Regarding Proposed Combination Between 
NYSE Group, Inc. and Euronext N.V., Securities and Exchange Commission Release No. 34-
55026, 72 Fed. Reg. 814, 817 (Dec. 29, 2006); Press Release, New York Stock Exchange, NYSE 
Group and Euronext N.V. Agree to a Merger of Equals (June 1, 2006), available at 
http://www.nyse.com/press/1149157439121.html. 
 28. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.15a-6 (2005).  See also A Global View: Examining Cross-Border 
Exhange Mergers: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Securities, Insurance and Investment of the 
S. Comm. on Banking Housing, and Urban Affairs, 110th Cong. (2007) (written statement of the 
SEC). 
 29. See Erik R. Sirri, Dir., SEC Div. of Mkt. Regulation, Speech: Trading Foreign Shares, 
(Mar. 1, 2007), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2007/spch030107ers.htm 
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with the profit interests of the exchanges. Pressure will build on the SEC to 
relax its regulatory framework to allow for Euronext-/OMX-listed 
companies and market participants to have full access to the NYSE/Nasdaq 
and vice-versa—in short, lower the barriers to the creation of a single 
market. 
This article examines the problem of regulating a transatlantic 
exchange. This article argues that the most appropriate regulatory strategy 
is a mutual recognition regime between the United States and European 
Union. One appropriate model for such a regime is the recently adopted 
Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID)—the new EU directive 
that provides a regulatory structure for European markets to operate in and 
among the various EU member states.30 The general MiFID approach can 
be extended to allow regulated exchanges and alternative trading systems in 
the United States and European Union to operate in both jurisdictions. 
In setting forth the benefits of the MiFID to the regulation of cross-
border exchanges, this article argues that consideration of the MiFID as a 
model for the SEC is not merely an academic exercise. The MiFID’s 
potential to increase the competitiveness of European exchanges compels 
the SEC to incorporate some of the MiFID’s best features in the way it 
regulates the operation of exchanges and other trading centers in the United 
States. To this end, this article sets forth and examines three changes in how 
the SEC regulates exchanges: separation of self-regulatory responsibilities 
from exchange operations; redefinition of best execution in the trade-
through rule to permit exchanges to compete on a variety of services, not 
only price; and the opening of the U.S. market to foreign financial services 
providers, which includes allowing foreign exchanges to place trading 
screens in the United States. Each of these changes will move the U.S. 
markets closer to the European markets and make it easier for U.S. and 
European markets to combine and share services across the Atlantic. 
This article also considers the advantages and problems associated with 
a MiFID-style mutual recognition regime between the United States and 
European Union. To put in place the type of regime envisioned in this 
article, U.S. regulators will have to reconsider some long-held views about 
the role and obligations of exchanges in our securities markets. I note the 
recent proposal of SEC officials Ethiopis Tafara and Robert J. Peterson for 
the SEC to adopt a policy of “selective substituted compliance.” While this 
article applauds the proposal for its acceptance of the basic principles of 
mutual recognition, it notes that the proposal does not go far enough to 
resolve the regulatory differences that exist between the U.S. and European 
                                                                                                                 
[hereinafter Sirri Speech]; Howell E. Jackson et al., Foreign Trading Screens in the United States, 
1 CAP. MKT. L.J. 54, 68–69 (2006). 
 30. Council Directive 2004/39, 2004 O.J. (L 145) 1–44 (EC) amended by Council Directive 
2006/31/EC, 2006 O.J. (L 114) 60–63 [hereinafter MiFID]. 
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markets and the task of coordinating regulation and enforcement between 
the United States and European Union. Consequently, much can still be 
learned from following the more ambitious blueprint for the regulation of 
U.S. and foreign exchanges laid out by the MiFID. 
Ultimately, the SEC must actively cooperate with EU regulators and 
seek a convergence of regulation. The problem of regulating cross-border 
exchanges should be viewed in the context of the SEC’s need to open up 
the U.S. securities markets to more international competition. By seeking to 
coordinate regulation with foreign jurisdictions, the SEC can ensure that 
high standards for the protection of investors are maintained in both the 
United States and European Union and that the U.S. markets remain the 
most competitive in the world. 
MARKETS IN FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS DIRECTIVE (MIFID) 
How to regulate entities across borders is an old problem for the 
European Union. One of the European Union’s primary objectives since 
1960 has been the elimination of national legal and regulatory barriers to 
create a single European financial market.31 Just as the SEC is now thinking 
about the conditions under which it will permit foreign exchanges to access 
the U.S. market, the European Union has struggled for years with the 
problem of how to convince its member states to open their markets to 
financial services firms from other EU member states. Its first attempt at 
creating a pan-European regulatory regime for financial services was the 
1993 Investment Services Directive (ISD).32 The main achievement of the 
ISD was to introduce a mutual recognition regime for financial-service 
firms.33 This mutual recognition framework raised the prospect of qualified 
firms operating freely in multiple European countries with the authorization 
of only one regulator. 
Most regulators and market participants, however, found the ISD to be 
flawed in practice. Despite its promotion of mutual recognition, the ISD did 
not stop host countries from imposing additional requirements on foreign 
firms or restricting which firms could apply for mutual recognition 
treatment.34 As a result, few firms were able to expand their operations to a 
foreign country and compete against the already-entrenched home firms. 
                                                                                                                 
 31. Eric J. Pan, Harmonization of U.S.-EU Securities Regulation: The Case for a Single 
European Securities Regulator, 34 L. & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 499, 499–500 (2003). 
 32. Council Directive 93/22/EEC, 1993 O.J. (L 141) 27–46 [hereinafter ISD]. 
 33. See Howell E. Jackson & Eric J. Pan, Regulatory Competition in International Securities 
Markets: Evidence from Europe in 1999-Part I, 56 BUS. LAW. 653, 677–78 (2001); Maria 
Szonert-Binienda, Passporting Financial Services Throughout the European Union, 116 
BANKING L.J. 456, 457–58 (1999). See generally Manning Gilbert Warren III, The European 
Union’s Investment Services Directive, 15 U. PA. J. INT’L BUS. L. 181 (1994) (describing the 
impact of the ISD on EU securities regulation). 
 34. See ISD, supra note 32. 
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The ISD only covered a limited number of investment services and 
products, failing to address the development of new markets like those in 
derivatives, and quickly became outdated. The ISD also failed to ensure that 
there was a regulatory framework to take into account both established 
regulated exchanges and the existence of ATSs.35 As the ISD covered only 
“regulated exchanges” (known as the “concentration rule”),36 its regime 
prevented trades of listed shares from taking place on ATSs, effectively 
insulating the main exchanges from any outside competition. Finally, the 
ISD failed to ensure complete cooperation among the national regulatory 
authorities. The ISD suffered from inconsistent implementation and did not 
provide for a means of making technical adjustments to smooth out the 
wrinkles of implementation once the directive took effect. Thus, firms 
continued to face different regulations and barriers to operating in multiple 
European countries without a formal mechanism to bridge regulatory 
differences. In response to these concerns and a decision to encourage 
greater competition among financial service firms, the European Union 
decided to draft an improved version of the ISD. This became the MiFID.37 
As a model for the SEC, five aspects of the MiFID are worth 
considering in detail: the passport; scope; definitions of business conduct, 
investor protection and best execution; provision of pre-trade and post-trade 
transparency; and recognition of customer categories. 
THE PASSPORT: MUTUAL RECOGNITION, MINIMUM 
STANDARDS AND HOME COUNTRY SUPERVISION 
The most important feature of the MiFID is the passport it carried 
forward from the ISD. Pursuant to the passport, any investment firm or 
exchange may operate in another EU member state if it has been authorized 
to conduct business by the competent authority of its home country.38 The 
passport itself consists of mutual recognition, minimum standards and home 
country supervision.39 
Mutual recognition requires that each country recognize the adequacy 
of the rules and regulations of another country to permit a regulated entity 
to do business in both jurisdictions. Mutual recognition depends on an 
independent determination by each state that the regulatory standards, and 
the subsequent enforcement of such standards, of a foreign firm’s home 
                                                                                                                 
 35. See id. 
 36. See, e.g., Warren, supra note 33. 
 37. The European Council adopted the MiFID in April 2004. Each EU member state is to 
implement MiFID no later than November 1, 2007. See MiFID, supra note 30, at art. 70; Caroline 
Bradley, Private International Law-Making for the Financial Markets, 29 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 
127, 147–50 (2005) (describing the consultation process in preparing MiFID). 
 38. See Niamh Moloney, Financial Market Regulation in the Post-Financial Services Action 
Plan Era, 55 INT’L COMP. L.Q. 982, 987 (2006). 
 39. See MiFID, supra note 30, at arts. 31, 32. 
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state are satisfactory and require no additional oversight and supervision by 
the host state. If there is true mutual recognition, the host country will not 
impose additional requirements on the entity regulated by the foreign 
jurisdiction, and the entity should have complete access to the host 
country’s market. If two jurisdictions recognize each other’s market 
regulations and supervisory competency, there will be a common market 
even if there is not complete harmonization of regulations.  
How a state determines whether another state’s regulatory standards are 
satisfactory must be negotiated. This will be one of the most important tasks 
in establishing a mutual recognition regime between the United States and 
the European Union. In the case of the MiFID, EU member states have 
become more receptive to the principle of mutual recognition because of the 
Lamfalussy process, a four-level procedural roadmap set forth by the 
Committee of Wise Men on the Regulation of European Securities 
Markets.40 Under the Lamfalussy process, the broad standards agreed to by 
the member states are set forth in a directive adopted pursuant to the EU 
legislative process. This exposition of framework principles is considered 
part of the Level 1 process. This was the same process used to adopt the 
ISD. Level 2 of the Lamfalussy process provides for promulgation of 
detailed implementing measures, prepared through consultation with EU 
officials, the European Securities Committee (ESC) (composed of the 
finance ministers from each EU member state) and the Committee of 
European Securities Regulators (CESR) (composed of representatives of 
each member state’s financial regulatory authority).41 While the passage of 
a directive must work slowly through EU legislative procedures, the Level 
2 process, consisting of permanent committees of expert regulators with 
direct authority in each EU member state, is designed to encourage more 
nimble, efficient regulation-making to keep up with market developments.42 
The Level 3 process consists of cooperation among regulators to ensure 
proper and consistent implementation of the directive and technical 
implementing measures, and the Level 4 process refers to the monitoring 
and enforcement of member-state compliance with the directive and 
technical implementing measures.43 Consequently, the Lamfalussy process 
                                                                                                                 
 40. See Eur. Comm’n, Alexandre Lamfalussy et al., Final Report of the Committee of Wise 
Men on the Regulation of European Securities Markets (2001), available at 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/securities/lamfalussy/index_en.htm [hereinafter Wise 
Men Report]. 
 41. European Commission recommendations for certain implementing measures were 
published on February 6, 2006. The ESC approved these measures in June 2006 with the advice of 
CESR, and the measures were formally adopted on September 2, 2006. See Commission Directive 
2006/73/EC, 2006 O.J. (L 241) 26 [hereinafter Implementing Directive]; Commission Regulation 
1287/2006, 2006 O.J. (L 241) 1 (EC). 
 42. See Wise Men Report, supra note 40, at 28–36. 
 43. Id. at 37–41. 
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offers an opportunity for national regulators to negotiate and ensure the 
implementation of certain standards. 
A second passport requirement is minimum standards—those common 
standards that are implemented and enforced in every country participating 
in the mutual recognition regime. The existence of minimum standards 
gives confidence to national regulators and market participants that the 
passport will not result in a regulatory race-to-the-bottom, where market 
participants engage in regulatory arbitrage to circumvent various host 
country rules or requirements. The MiFID sets forth the minimum standards 
that must be in place in all member states.44 In the case of past EU 
directives, inconsistencies in how member states implemented the broad, 
and sometimes vague, terms of directives frustrated the effectiveness of 
minimum standards.45 By having national regulators participate in the EU 
standard-setting process and providing more detailed and technical 
instructions, the Lamfalussy process should improve how each member 
state implements the MiFID and ensure compliance with the minimum 
standards set forth in the directive. 
At the same time, the MiFID limits the ability of member states to 
impose additional requirements on investment firms. Article 4 of the 
Implementing Directive provides that member states may only impose 
additional requirements on investment firms if such requirements are 
justified and proportionate to the relevant risks to investor protection or 
market integrity.46 This limitation ensures that foreign investment firms are 
not denied access to certain markets because some member states attempt to 
impose additional requirements to protect domestic firms. 
The final characteristic of the passport is the principle of home-country 
supervision. Under the MiFID, each entity that conducts business in the 
European Union is subject to the supervision of its home country.47 The 
principle of home-country supervision is important in defining the 
regulatory responsibility of each member state. Without an agreement on 
home-country supervision, a firm may be prevented from conducting its 
                                                                                                                 
 44. See MiFID, supra note 30, at arts. 5–30. 
 45. See Michel Tison, The Investment Services Directive and Its Implementation in the EU 
Member States 21–30 (1999) (Univ. of Ghent Law Sch., Fin. Law Inst., Working Paper No. 1999-
17, 1999), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=193270. 
 46. See Implementing Directive, supra note 41, at art. 4. 
 47. See, e.g., MiFID, supra note 30, at art. 5 (requiring authorization by home member state 
authority) and art. 31 (requiring member states to give free access to investment firms regulated 
by the competent authority of another member state). The one exception in the MiFID to the 
principle of home country supervision is the regulation of branches. Under the MiFID, firms can 
establish branches in other states without the authorization of the host state. The firms, however, 
have to report on the operations of these branches to their home regulator who in turn must pass 
on information to the host state. In addition, the host state is responsible for ensuring that the 
branch of the foreign firm complies with all conduct of business, best execution, transaction 
reporting and pre- and post-trade transparency obligations. See id. at art. 32. 
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operations in more than one jurisdiction because of conflicting regulations 
imposed by competing regulators. Either inconsistent regulations or the host 
country’s imposition of additional obligations on the foreign firm could 
deter entry by the firm. By imposing the primacy of the principle of home 
country supervision, the MiFID resolves uncertainty regarding the 
applicable regulatory authority and eliminates the regulatory barriers that 
may stand in the way of cross-border operations. 
SCOPE OF THE DIRECTIVE 
The MiFID serves as a comprehensive legislative act drafted to cover 
all areas of the financial services industry, making the MiFID a more 
ambitious directive than the ISD. The MiFID governs any entity engaged in 
the selling of securities or investment products, including investment banks, 
broker-dealers, fund managers, futures and options firms, and some 
commodities firms.48 The MiFID requires firms to satisfy certain corporate 
governance requirements, file reports to the relevant competent authority 
regarding any changes to management, maintain sufficient regulatory 
capital (as set forth in the Capital Requirements Directive),49 manage any 
conflicts of interest between themselves and their clients, and maintain 
minimum internal controls, including risk management and outsourcing of 
critical functions.50 
The MiFID also covers a broader range of financial instruments than 
the ISD.51 The MiFID passport now extends to services pertaining to 
financial commodity derivatives, credit derivatives and other financial 
contracts. 52 
Most importantly, the MiFID governs the operation of both exchanges 
and alternative trading systems.53 One of the deficiencies of the ISD was 
that it only extended the mutual recognition passport to “regulated 
markets,” as defined by each member state.54 This limitation allowed 
individual member states to deny the passport to ATSs. The MiFID 
removes this limitation by extending the benefits of the passport to 
                                                                                                                 
 48. See MiFID, supra note 30. 
 49. See Council Directive 2006/48/EC, 2006 O.J. (L 177) (relating to the taking up and pursuit 
of the business of credit institutions); Council Directive 2006/49/EC, 2006 O.J. (L 177) (relating 
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 50. See MiFID, supra note 30. 
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investment undertakings and financial derivatives. See ISD, supra note 32. 
 52. See MiFID, supra note 30, at arts. 31, 32. 
 53. See id. 
 54. ISD, supra note 32, at art. 16. 
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“multilateral trading facilities” (MTFs), a term that encompasses ATSs.55 
The MiFID requires MTFs to meet many of the same obligations already 
required of exchanges: presentation of transparent criteria for determining 
the financial instruments that can be traded on their systems, fair and 
orderly trading rules and rules to allow for efficient settlement of trades and 
non-discriminatory rules for access to their systems.56 Consequently, the 
MiFID ensures that all markets, whether exchanges or MTFs, are subject to 
the same market-integrity standards. 
BUSINESS CONDUCT; BEST EXECUTION 
The MiFID also puts into place new rules of conduct for investment 
firms in Europe.57 The MiFID states that firms have to act “honestly, fairly 
and professionally” and, in accordance with the best interests of their 
clients, communicate in a way that is fair, clear and not misleading, and 
provide clients with appropriate information about the firm, its services and 
the costs, and associated charges.58 In addition, the MiFID puts a “know-
your-client” obligation on firms: They are required to collect information 
from their clients in order to determine whether a particular service or 
product is suitable to the client.59 
One key area where the European Union took a different approach than 
the one taken by the SEC60 is in defining the obligation of investment firms 
to obtain the best possible results for their clients. Under the MiFID, a firm 
is to take into consideration a range of factors in order to meet its best 
execution obligation. In addition to price, the firm should consider cost, 
speed, size, nature of the order and the likelihood of execution, and 
settlement.61 The MiFID does not emphasize one factor over another, but 
rather places the burden on the firms to develop a process for achieving best 
execution.62 
                                                                                                                 
 55. Article 4(1)(15) of the MiFID defines a “multilateral trading facility” as a “multilateral 
system, operated by an investment firm or a market operator, which brings together multiple third-
party buying and selling interests in financial instruments – in the system and in accordance with 
non-discretionary rules – in a way that results in a contract in accordance with the provision of 
Title II.” MiFID, supra note 30, at art. 4. 
 56. See id. at art. 14. 
 57. See Emilios Avgouleas, The Harmonisation of Rules of Conduct in EU Financial Markets: 
Economic Analysis, Subsidiarity and Investor Protection, 6 EUR. L.J. 72 (2000). 
 58. See MiFID, supra note 30, at art. 19. 
 59. Id. 
 60. See infra pp. 153–54. 
 61. See MiFID, supra note 30, at art. 21(1). 
 62. See id. at art. 21(2). 
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PRE-TRADE AND POST-TRADE TRANSPARENCY 
The MiFID sets forth several principles to regulate market transparency 
and integrity. To mitigate concerns about market fragmentation and the 
migration of order flow to non-regulated internalizers, the MiFID requires 
public disclosure of certain pre-trade and post-trade information by equity 
markets and “systematic internalizers” so that customers will know what 
the best bids and offers for each trade are.63 
First, the MiFID requires systematic internalizers to publish quotes on a 
regular and continuous basis during trading hours for shares for which there 
is a liquid market.64 The MiFID defines systematic internalizers as 
investment firms, which, on an organized, frequent and systematic basis, 
deal on their own accounts by executing client orders outside a regulated 
market or MTF.65 Requiring systematic internalizers to disclose bid and 
offer quotes for shares traded by systematic internalizers benefits customers 
who wish to ensure they are having their trades executed at the best 
available prices. As a result, systematic internalizers are forced to meet the 
same obligations as the exchanges and MTFs, which already provide pre-
trade transparency.66 
Under the MiFID, firms executing trades on a customer’s behalf must 
provide more information to their customers about the terms under which 
the trade was executed. The MiFID is most concerned with off-exchange 
trades where the customer has less opportunity to confirm its trade was 
executed on the best terms. To address this problem, the MiFID requires 
public disclosure of the terms of a trade if the shares being traded are 
admitted to trading on a regulated market.67 
The MiFID imposes additional transparency requirements on MTFs. 
MTFs must publicly report current bid and offer prices and the depth of 
trading interests at these prices,68 which are advertised on their systems in 
respect of shares admitted to trading on a regulated market. Likewise, after 
the execution of the trade, an MTF must make public the price, volume and 
time of the trade executed on its system in respect of shares admitted to 
trading on a regulated market.69 Collectively, these transparency 
requirements encourage the development of a centralized order book where 
bid and offer information for certain shares, whether it is found on an 
                                                                                                                 
 63. Id. at art. 27. 
 64. Id. at art. 27(1). 
 65. Id. at art. 4(1)(7). 
 66. Id. at art. 27(1). 
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 68. Id. at art. 29. 
 69. Id. at art. 30. 
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exchange or an MTF, or provided by a systematic internalizer, is made 
available to the marketplace.70 
In addition, the MiFID requires regulated markets and MTFs to 
supervise trading on their markets and report misconduct to the relevant 
regulator. Investment firms must maintain records of all of their 
transactions for up to five years so that regulators can monitor on-going 
transactions and conduct investigations into fraud, insider trading and 
money laundering.71  
CUSTOMER CATEGORIES 
The MiFID also sets different standards for each customer category. 
Retail investors benefit from the heaviest protection, and firms are given 
more freedom to avoid certain MiFID requirements when they conduct 
business with professional clients or other sophisticated entities. For 
example, the conduct of business, best execution and client order-handling 
rules are waived for entities classified as “eligible counterparties.”72 The 
MiFID considers, among others, investment firms, credit institutions, 
insurance companies, common funds or unit trusts and pension funds 
eligible counterparties.73 These entities are sophisticated enough not to need 
the benefit of the MiFID’s investor protection rules, and it is expected that 
they will be able to demand or negotiate their own protections as necessary. 
The MiFID also allows systematic internalizers to distinguish between 
retail and professional clients in executing trades in accordance with 
published quotes. Professional clients include regulated financial service 
providers, corporate entities of a certain size, governmental bodies and 
individuals with sufficient investment experience, wealth and/or financial 
knowledge.74 The MiFID permits systematic internalizers to execute trades 
                                                                                                                 
 70. In its November 2002 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on Investment Services and Regulated Markets, amending Council Directives 
85/611/EEC, Council Directive 39/6/EEC and European Parliament and Council Directive 
2000/12/EC, the European Commission stated: 
The operation of an integrated financial market requires that orders to buy and sell 
financial instruments interact effectively, freely and instantaneously with each other on 
a cross-border basis. Requiring investment firms to consider trading conditions on a 
reasonable range of execution venues, and to route orders to the venues offering the 
best prices, will ensure that liquidity responds quickly to price differentials. 
Commission Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
Investment Services and Regulated Markets, and Amending Council Directives 85/611/EEC, 
Council Directive 93/6/EEC and European Parliament and Council Directive 2000/12/EC, at 26, 
COM (2002) 625 final (Nov. 19, 2002). 
 71. See MiFID, supra note 30, at art. 25(2). 
 72. Id. at para. 41. 
 73. Id. at art. 24(2). 
 74. See id. at Annex II. 
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at prices different from published quotes when the customer is a 
professional client and the trade involves amounts larger than those 
normally requested by retail clients.75 
POLICIES BEHIND MIFID 
By all measures, the MiFID creates a comprehensive regulatory 
framework for the regulation of markets in the European Union and the 
formation of a single European financial market. Equally notable about the 
MiFID are the policy principles that underlie many of its provisions. 
First, the MiFID establishes a regulatory framework designed to 
encourage cross-border competition among trading venues. MTFs now can 
take advantage of the passport to provide services across Europe. Regulated 
markets and MTFs now have the right to place trading screens in countries 
outside that in which they are registered without pre-approval of domestic 
regulatory authorities.76 At the same time, these trading venues must now 
provide minimum levels of investor protection and satisfy certain pre- and 
post-trade transparency requirements.77 These provisions allow regulated 
markets, MTFs and systematic internalizers to compete for trading volume 
on an equal regulatory playing field. 
The MiFID also avoids limiting the scope of competition by allowing 
trading venues to compete in best execution and client-appropriate services. 
While requiring best execution of trades, the MiFID elects to adopt a broad 
definition of best execution, providing ample room for trading venues to 
offer a variety of options to clients.78 This means some trading venues can 
provide “better” services for clients seeking price superiority, while others 
may attract clients seeking execution certainty or lower administration 
costs. To encourage further market differentiation, the MiFID allows 
trading venues to offer different services to different types of clients.79 In so 
doing, it recognizes that professional clients require less protection than 
retail clients and may value different services. As a result, trading venues 
will be able to offer specialized services to retail and professional clients. 
Second, the MiFID recognizes the importance of regulatory cooperation 
in maintaining a mutual recognition regime. The Lamfalussy process lays 
out a process by which common standards can be agreed upon between 
member states, but the MiFID also provides that there be sufficient on-
                                                                                                                 
 75. Id. at art. 27(3). 
 76. Id. at arts. 31(5), (6). See also Eur. Comm’n, Comm. of Eur. Sec. Regulators, The Passport 
Under MiFID: Recommendations for the Implementation of the Directive 2004/39/EC and 
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going regulatory cooperation to ensure continued relevance of these 
regulatory standards. Regulatory cooperation consists of information 
sharing, joint supervision, rights of investigation, consultation and joint 
enforcement.80 The MiFID also takes advantage of the new European 
institutions like CESR to coordinate regulatory responses to changes in the 
market. 81 
Regulatory cooperation is necessary to facilitate competition. The ISD 
failed in part because it did not eliminate all of the regulatory barriers 
preventing cross-operation of investment firms. Certain member states 
refused to follow the spirit of the mutual recognition regime either because 
of market-integrity concerns or protectionism.82 As the MiFID is just being 
implemented, it is too early to tell if it will suffer from the same fate, but 
the MiFID has more strongly addressed the need for regulatory cooperation. 
Third, the MiFID reflects the European Union’s ambition to make the 
European financial markets competitive with other markets, especially the 
United States. The European Union drafted the MiFID not only with an eye 
toward getting its internal markets in order, but also to give it leverage to 
demand access to other markets. The MiFID explicitly denies branches of 
investment firms from third countries to establish themselves or provide 
services in any EU member state without assurances that EU firms will 
receive reciprocal treatment in return.83 Article 15 of the MiFID provides 
that member states are to inform the European Commission of any 
difficulties faced by their firms when attempting to provide services 
abroad.84 The Commission may direct member states to limit or suspend 
any decision to authorize firms from a third country to conduct business in 
the member state, and the Commission may continue to stop these non-EU 
firms from doing business in the European Union until it is satisfied that 
reciprocal treatment is offered by the third country. Article 15 offers the 
European Union a potentially powerful tool to seek concessions from the 
United States, especially with respect to allowing European firms and 
exchanges direct access to the U.S. market. 
RETHINKING THE U.S. SYSTEM 
The difference between the EU and U.S. regulatory regimes illustrates 
one important reason why the European markets demutualized, adopted 
                                                                                                                 
 80. See, e.g., id. at arts. 49, 56, 57, 59. 
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electronic trading, and consolidated more than 20 years earlier than their 
U.S. counterparts. The European markets expanded and competed in a 
fragmented regulatory environment where each exchange operated in 
accordance with national laws and regulations. Each EU member state had 
its own national exchange, and European companies frequently had their 
primary listings on an exchange located in their home country.85 After 
adoption of the ISD in 1993, the various national exchanges in Europe—
each still subject to their different local rules—began competing with one 
another for order flow in European stocks. The introduction of the ISD 
made it easier for European exchanges to extend their operations to other 
parts of the European Union and compete with each other. This direct 
competition eventually led to the combination of national exchanges into 
multi-jurisdictional-European exchanges like Euronext and OMX and the 
placement of trading screens across Europe by Deutsche Börse and the 
LSE. 
In contrast, the U.S. regulatory environment, until recently, has shielded 
U.S. exchanges from similar pressure to innovate and compete. Under the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934,86 and the rules and regulations 
thereunder, U.S. exchanges are subject to SEC oversight and also serve as 
regulators of broker-dealers, market makers and listed companies.87 As self-
regulatory organizations (SROs), the established exchanges had little 
incentive to adopt new trading technology or to be worried about new 
entrants challenging their dominance of the trading of listed equity 
securities. 
The barriers to entry for new competitors were high, and the SEC 
prevented foreign competitors from entering the marketplace.88 A start-up 
exchange had to register first as an exchange with the SEC and take on the 
responsibilities (and costs) of being a SRO. Assuming this new exchange 
could meet the necessary regulatory requirements, it would be difficult for 
the exchange to challenge the natural monopoly enjoyed by the established 
exchanges over the trading of existing equity securities.89 At the same time, 
the SEC limited the ownership of exchanges to not-for-profit organizations, 
                                                                                                                 
 85. See Jackson & Pan, supra note 33, at 677–78. 
 86. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78nn (2000). 
 87. For a detailed description of the operation of exchanges as self-regulatory organizations 
(SROs) and the relevant rules and regulations governing SROs, please see Onnig H. Dombalagian, 
Demythologizing the Stock Exchange: Reconciling Self-Regulation and the National Market 
System, 39 U. RICH. L. REV. 1069 (2005); Andreas M. Fleckner, Stock Exchanges at the 
Crossroads, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 2541 (2006); Joel Seligman, Cautious Evolution or Perennial 
Irresolution: Stock Market Self-Regulation during the First Seventy Years of the Securities and 
Exchange Commission, 59 BUS. LAW. 1347 (2004). 
 88. See Jackson et al., supra note 29, at 58–59, 68–69. 
 89. In 1963, the SEC Special Study on the securities markets noted that trading volume was 
migrating to the primary exchanges at the expense of the smaller regional exchanges. See 
Dombalagian, supra note 87, at 1083. 
150 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. [Vol. 2 
 
limiting any new exchange’s ability to raise money from outside sources.90 
It was not until 1998 in Regulation ATS that the SEC relaxed its position 
and suggested that in limited cases exchanges could operate as for-profit 
organizations.91 The most serious potential competitors were foreign 
exchanges that had the money, market-depth potential and technology to 
compete effectively against the NYSE and other established U.S. 
exchanges, but the SEC refused to grant the necessary regulatory 
accommodations to allow foreign exchanges to provide services in the 
United States.92 
Not surprisingly, the U.S. market continues to be dominated by only 
two exchanges. In 1936, the NYSE handled the trading of 85% of the 
market value of all securities on organized exchanges in the United States.93 
The New York Curb Exchange (later known as the American Stock 
Exchange (Amex)) handled 11%.94 Today, the NYSE remains the largest 
stock exchange in the United States. It handles approximately the same 
share of the market as it had in 1936, and Nasdaq, which came to 
prominence initially as a quotation system for over-the-counter shares, has 
assumed Amex’s position as the second largest exchange in the United 
States.95 
NATIONAL MARKET SYSTEM 
Domestic ATSs have supplied the main competitive pressure on the 
NYSE, Nasdaq and Amex to innovate and lower costs.96 As the result of the 
SEC’s drive to consolidate the exchanges and ATSs into a national market 
system, NYSE and Nasdaq have become public companies and sought to 
merge or acquire ATSs that have developed more advanced electronic 
trading platforms.97 
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In its 1973 Policy Statement on the Structure of a Central Market 
System, the SEC stated that “the most important objective of the system is 
to foster the development of strong competition among its participants.”98 
To achieve this goal, Congress passed the Securities Acts Amendments of 
1975, authorizing the SEC to establish a “national market system.”99 The 
SEC required the SROs to disclose trading information in real time and 
develop electronic linkages to open up trading across markets. The 
establishment of the Intermarket Trading System made cross-market trading 
easier.100 The 1975 amendments also strengthened SEC control over 
exchanges and placed new obligations on exchanges to regulate broker-
dealers and market makers.101 
Eventually, the SEC had to respond to the movement of trading volume 
from the registered exchanges to the less regulated ATSs.102 ATSs allowed 
investors to trade among themselves while avoiding the disclosure and 
regulatory obligations imposed on the exchanges. ATSs also permitted 
investors to trade directly with each other rather than only through 
registered broker-dealers. When the SEC determined that market makers 
were able to trade at superior prices on ATSs, creating an arbitrage 
opportunity between the private ATSs and the more open exchanges, the 
SEC sought to integrate ATSs into the national market system and make 
quotations on ATSs publicly available.103 
In thinking about how to regulate ATSs, the SEC faced a dilemma. On 
one hand, ATSs were more aggressive than exchanges in investing in new 
electronic trading platforms.104 They developed these sophisticated trading 
systems to attract brokers and institutional investors who appreciated the 
speed and efficiency in which trades could be executed on ATSs. When the 
NYSE and Nasdaq recognized that they needed to upgrade their systems to 
compete more effectively against ATSs, they both acquired the technology 
through takeovers of the two most prominent ATSs, Archipelago and 
Instinet.105 
On the other hand, the SEC recognized that ATSs had certain 
advantages over the exchanges, stemming from the fact that ATSs did not 
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have to meet the same regulatory burdens. Because they were not SROs, 
ATSs did not have to bear the costs of regulating their members and 
customers, nor did they have to meet the same reporting requirements as 
exchanges, or make their order books public.106 These advantages meant 
that ATSs had lower expenses than the exchanges and investors enjoyed 
lower trading costs. In addition, orders to ATSs did not have to be routed 
through a registered broker-dealer, making ATSs even more attractive to 
investors. Altogether the advantages enjoyed by ATSs allowed ATSs to 
capture valuable order flow and meant that ATSs sometimes provided 
better bid and ask prices than the exchanges.107 The SEC noted that these 
advantages benefited only those investors that had access to the ATSs—
primarily institutional investors—placing smaller investors at a 
disadvantage.108 
In response, the SEC promulgated Regulation ATS in 1998.109 Under 
Regulation ATS, the SEC required ATSs to elect between being registered 
as exchanges or being treated as broker-dealers. In order to ensure the 
soundness of ATSs, the regulation required ATSs to submit to various 
record-keeping, notice and market surveillance requirements. As an ATS 
conducted more business, it would assume additional regulatory 
responsibilities, much like an exchange. In addition, Regulation ATS 
imposed certain transparency and trading access requirements on ATSs. In 
the case where an ATS handles a high portion of the trading volume of a 
particular security, the ATS is required to report its best orders to a central 
quotation system on a registered exchange.110 
Regulation ATS reflected the SEC’s difficulty in deciding how to 
incorporate ATSs into the national market system and to define ATSs’ 
relationship to exchanges. The SEC sought to strike a middle path between 
allowing certain ATSs to continue to operate with light regulation and 
oversight while imposing additional regulatory oversight requirements on 
larger ATSs that posed a more direct competitive threat to exchanges. 
Unfortunately, the degree to which certain ATSs might reach a size where 
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they would have to comply with certain additional regulations was a source 
of great confusion.111 
The regulation of exchanges and ATSs in the United States culminated 
in the promulgation of Regulation NMS in 2005.112 Regulation NMS 
introduced several significant market reforms to strengthen the national 
market system. Regulation NMS consisted of four parts: (i) the “trade-
through” or Order Protection Rule,113 (ii) the Access Rule,114 (iii) the Sub-
penny Rule115 and (iv) the Market Data Rules.116 
The trade-through rule requires “trading centers” to ensure the 
execution of a trade at the best price available on any automated trading 
center. Regulation NMS defines trading centers broadly to include 
exchanges, national securities associations that operate SRO trading 
facilities, ATSs, exchange market-makers, over-the-counter market-makers 
and any broker-dealers that execute orders internally by trading as principal 
or crossing orders as agent.117 This definition tracks the MiFID terms MTFs 
and systematic internalizers.118 If a trading center receives a bid where the 
best offer is located at another trading center, the trading center must route 
the trade to the other trading center. The trade-through rule applies, 
however, only to automated trading centers. Therefore, trading centers do 
not have to route trades to a trading center that cannot match a bid within 
one second of receipt even if that trading center offers a better price.119 The 
limitation of the trade-through rule only to automated trading centers was 
the main reason why both the NYSE and American Stock Exchange moved 
from exclusively floor-trading systems to hybrid trading systems. 
In the SEC’s view, the trade-through rule helps accomplish three goals. 
First, the trade-through rule should increase investor confidence in the 
markets by ensuring that investor orders are always executed at the best 
prices.120 In developing the trade-through rule, the SEC was most concerned 
about the protection of retail investors, who would be vulnerable to having 
their trading orders executed at inferior prices. Institutional investors, on the 
other hand, generally are better informed and have more opportunities to 
ensure their orders are executed at the best prices. Second, the SEC believed 
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that the trade-through rule lowers trading costs and increases market 
liquidity by encouraging the greater use of limit orders.121 Finally, the SEC 
believed the trade-through rule would foster competition among trading 
centers for orders, since orders have to be directed to whichever trading 
center has the best prices.122 The trading center that offers the best price 
therefore would capture trading volume, and higher trading volume would 
lead to more revenue from trading fees and enough liquidity to continue to 
ensure the best prices. Trading centers began complying with the trade-
through rule in March 2007.123 
The access rule aims to ensure non-discriminatory access to quotations 
displayed by the exchanges (but not other trading centers) by any person 
seeking to obtain quotations through members, subscribers or customers of 
the exchanges. Among other rules to make it easier for outsiders to access 
another trading center’s quotations, Regulation NMS limits the fees charged 
by trading centers for certain quotations to no more than $0.003 per 
share.124 
The sub-penny pricing rule prohibits market participants from 
displaying or otherwise accepting quotations that are priced in units less 
than $0.01.125 
Finally, the market data rule changes the formula for how revenues 
from market data fees are used to support SROs. The main change was to 
modify the formula to ensure that SROs that provided quotation 
information received more revenue.126 
CONFLICTING GOALS OF THE SEC 
For nearly seventy-five years, the SEC has attempted to balance three 
objectives in how it regulates trading markets and broker-dealers: self 
regulation, protection of retail investors and competition among trading 
centers. The SEC made the decision early on to delegate regulatory 
authority to the SROs. Allowing the exchanges and broker-dealers to self-
regulate was initially a way of soothing opposition by the exchanges and 
broker-dealers to the new agency.127 Quickly, however, the SEC embraced 
self-regulation as a more effective way to regulate the activities of 
exchanges and broker-dealers, as compared to direct regulation by the SEC. 
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The SEC believed the SROs to be in a superior position to regulate the 
securities industry because they would be better informed about 
marketplace activities, be better able to monitor and ensure the compliance 
of its own members to applicable rules and regulations, and through self-
financing of regulatory activities be more capably funded.128 SROs also had 
another big advantage over the SEC: SROs would not be bound by due 
process standards like a government agency and therefore could act faster to 
stop and punish market actors for fraud or unfairness in the marketplace.129 
In the meantime, the SEC could stand back from the day-to-day regulation 
of the marketplace and intervene when problems arose—a “shotgun, so to 
speak, behind the door, loaded, well oiled, cleaned, ready for use but with 
the hope it would never have to be.”130 At times when SROs have failed to 
prevent fraud or abuse, the government has tightened the leash on them,131 
but the SEC remains committed to the ideal of the securities industry 
regulating itself and all of the ancillary benefits. 
The other objective that the SEC has consistently pursued in its 
rulemaking is the protection of investors, especially retail investors. The 
focus on retail investors has driven the SEC to seek greater transparency in 
order books and increase public access to market data. It also led the SEC to 
adopt the trade-through rule, with the rule’s emphasis on always executing 
trades at the best price. The trade-through rule thus prevents trading centers 
from providing services that may be especially attractive to institutional 
investors and less beneficial to retail investors.  
Finally, the SEC has sought to encourage greater competition among 
trading centers. Pursuant to Section 11A of the Securities Exchange Act, the 
SEC has viewed development of the national market system as the way of 
linking all of the various U.S. trading centers in a shared order book with 
cross-market order routing to ensure that trades are always completed at the 
best available price.132 
In attempting to create a national market system, however, the SEC has 
undermined its other objective of increasing competition. Competition can 
come from three directions. New trading markets can be formed, offering 
customers better execution technology and charging lower trading fees. To 
the extent better trading technology and lower fees are not enough, a rival 
market can try to siphon off order flow by offering superior price discovery 
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or particular services to institutional customers. Or, to the extent domestic 
markets cannot provide adequate competition, foreign exchanges with 
proven technology and better financing could be allowed to provide 
services in the United States and challenge the NYSE and Nasdaq for 
listings and order flow. In each case, however, regulatory barriers prevent 
viable competitive pressure from being exerted from any of these 
directions. 
The SEC’s desire to protect the self-regulatory system and promote the 
interests of retail investors has made it difficult for new entities to challenge 
the dominance of the large U.S. exchanges.  In the United States the NYSE 
and Nasdaq dominate the trading of equity securities. They attract the 
highest number of customer orders, which places them in a stronger 
competitive position relative to other exchanges and ATSs. As noted 
earlier, this dominance has remained constant for the past century with the 
exception of Nasdaq, assuming the second-place position once held by 
Amex.133 
The attraction of order flow is vital to the business of an exchange. 
Order flow perpetuates the attractiveness of the exchange. Increased order 
flow makes the exchange more liquid. Liquidity means not only better 
prices, but also faster execution of trades.134 
Order flow also directly affects how much revenue the exchange can 
generate. An exchange relies primarily on three sources of revenue: trading 
fees, listing fees and market data fees.135 Of the three, the biggest source of 
revenue is trading fees. Trading fees are the fees that an exchange charges 
customers for each trade. The more order flow, the more trading fees 
generated. In the year ended December 31, 2006, the NYSE reported 
$675.9 million in revenue from trading fees compared to $356.1 million 
from listing fees and $222.5 million from market data fees.136 Order flow 
also allows the exchange to generate more listing fees and market data fees. 
Listing fees are the fees paid by companies to have their securities listed on 
the exchange. As order flow is a key component of liquidity, an exchange 
that can attract more order flow will be an attractive exchange for 
companies on which to seek a listing. Likewise, an exchange that attracts 
order flow can charge more in market data fees. 
It is very difficult for a competitor to dethrone an exchange once that 
exchange has established itself as the dominant recipient of order flow. A 
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competitor faces the classic chicken-and-egg problem: Bid and ask prices 
superior to those offered on the established exchange may encourage more 
orders, but without already existing order flow it is difficult for the 
competitor to offer consistently superior prices. 
The need for an exchange to register itself with the SEC is a further 
hindrance to direct competition between the established exchanges and 
rising ATSs. Since the 1980s, ATSs like Instinet have been quite popular 
with brokers and institutional investors that appreciated the faster execution 
speeds, lower trading costs and anonymity offered by the electronic trading 
systems.137 ATSs also did not have to limit membership to registered 
broker-dealers, giving institutional investors direct access to the trading 
system and an additional way to minimize trading costs.138 As ATSs started 
to handle a greater share of the trading volume for certain securities, the 
SEC promulgated Regulation ATS.139 The added regulatory burden of 
becoming an exchange or taking on exchange-like obligations imposed by 
Regulation ATS140 undermines many of the reasons ATSs were attractive to 
brokers and investors. 
The second regulatory challenge to a new exchange stems from its 
obligation to participate in the national market system and comply with 
Regulation NMS.141 The trade-through rule in Regulation NMS has the 
effect of favoring the dominant exchanges by requiring brokers to execute 
trades on the exchange offering the best price. The market that handles the 
greatest amount of order flow will generally be the market that offers the 
best price.142 As a result, the trade-through rule perpetuates the dominant 
position of the largest exchanges. The only opportunity that a new exchange 
has to challenge the established exchange’s dominance is by offering other 
services to customers beyond price. For example, the exchange could offer 
faster execution speeds, anonymous trading or better execution certainty. 
Regulation NMS’s trade-through rule, however, denies smaller exchanges 
this opportunity. 
Finally, the SEC has prevented foreign exchanges from offering 
services directly to U.S. investors without registering as a U.S. exchange. 
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While U.S. investors have myriad ways to buy foreign shares abroad on 
foreign exchanges, foreign exchanges do not yet have the opportunity to 
place trading terminals in the United States. This would make it easier for 
U.S. brokers to execute trades on the foreign exchanges.143 The SEC has the 
power to exempt foreign exchanges from the registration requirement, but 
has chosen to do so only if and when the foreign market limits access and 
trading volume.144 The result is that the NYSE and Nasdaq are insulated 
from serious foreign competition. 
SUGGESTIONS FOR INCREASING COMPETITION 
In order to facilitate greater competition among exchanges, three 
changes should be made to how U.S. trading markets are regulated. First, 
the operation of exchanges should be separated from their regulatory 
functions. It is worth noting again that the self-regulatory obligations of an 
exchange serve as an entry-barrier to new competitors. New exchanges 
must build up their regulatory capacities or outsource their SRO 
responsibilities to another SRO.145 But, even from the perspective of 
ensuring sound regulation, it would be wise to remove from exchanges the 
responsibility of regulating certain market participants. It has been noted by 
several commentators that there is an inherent contradiction between the 
SRO duties of an exchange and its for-profit activities.146 As an SRO, the 
exchange is responsible for monitoring the activities of brokers, setting and 
enforcing listing standards and guarding market integrity. As a for-profit 
enterprise, however, the exchange is trying to attract brokers and issuers. 
The brokers execute trades on behalf of customers and play an important 
role in directing order flow to the exchange. Issuers decide where to list. 
Therefore, tougher regulation of brokers and companies may have a direct 
impact on the exchange’s revenue streams.147 In addition, exchanges may 
be in a position of regulating their competitors. ATSs that choose to be 
regulated as broker-dealers must subject themselves to oversight by an 
SRO, which may be one of the exchanges.148 
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Second, the SEC should revisit the trade-through rule and allow trades 
to be executed on the basis of criteria other than best price. The SEC chose 
to define best execution by best price to protect retail investors. The 
expressed concern was that retail investors would be unable to prevent 
brokers from executing their trade orders at inferior prices.149 However, the 
breadth of the trade-through rule harms those customers who may wish to 
have their trades executed at inferior prices if it enables them to have their 
trades executed more quickly or on an anonymous basis.150 
Finally, the SEC should reconsider its policy regarding the placement 
of foreign trading screens in the United States. There is ample evidence that 
U.S. investors already actively invest in foreign securities in foreign 
markets and that the prohibition on foreign trading screens serves only to 
increase the cost of investing abroad.151 Instead, the SEC should consider an 
alternative to full registration that would allow foreign exchanges that met 
certain market-integrity and investor-protection requirements to provide 
services in the United States.152 
There have been several recent developments that move in the direction 
suggested by this article. In November 2006, the SEC announced that the 
NASD and NYSE Regulation will combine their member-regulation 
functions into a single entity.153 The new entity, recently named the 
Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA),154 will be completely 
independent of any exchange.155 The main purpose of the creation of this 
combined regulator is to eliminate duplicate regulation of the same brokers 
that handle orders on both the NYSE and Nasdaq. Also, the shifting of 
certain regulatory responsibilities away from the NYSE was meant to 
address concerns about potential conflicts with the exchange’s for-profit 
operations.156 
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While the creation of FINRA is a significant regulatory development, it 
does not fully address all of the concerns about the conflict between an 
exchange’s regulatory activities and its market operations. What remains of 
NYSE Regulation will continue to oversee the market integrity of the 
NYSE and ensure that companies on the NYSE comply with NYSE listing 
standards.157 There is still the potential that the NYSE will not vigorously 
enforce its listing standards in the face of other exchanges competing for 
new listings. 
The SEC also is reconsidering its position regarding foreign trading 
screens. In several public statements, SEC commissioners have stated that 
under certain circumstances the SEC may allow foreign trading screens to 
be placed in the United States.158 The likelihood of the SEC allowing 
trading screens to come into the United States on a regular basis is 
dependent on the SEC’s implementation of the Tafara and Peterson 
proposal of substituted compliance.159 
ADOPTION OF THE MIFID APPROACH 
Recent statements by senior SEC officials indicate that the SEC is 
receptive to rethinking how it regulates exchanges, bringing the prospect of 
a mutual recognition regime with the European Union, and possibly other 
jurisdictions, closer to reality.160 What is less clear from these statements is 
how the SEC will accomplish this outcome and what the principles guiding 
a substituted compliance regime between one or more foreign jurisdictions 
will be. The MiFID offers a possible roadmap for the SEC concerning how 
it should modify the U.S. regulatory environment for trading markets and 
open up the U.S. market. While the complete adoption of MiFID provisions 
by the United States is unwise and does not take into account the legal, 
political and economic differences between the United States and the 
European Union, the SEC can and should learn from the regulatory policies 
effected by the MiFID. 
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In particular, the MiFID offers guidance concerning how to promote 
competition among trading markets and how to regulate trading markets 
that operate in multiple jurisdictions. The MiFID does not impose the same 
types of regulatory barriers to competition as those that exist in the U.S. 
system. The MiFID does not place registration requirements on trading 
platforms as does the SEC. In fact, one of the main improvements of the 
MiFID over the ISD was to expand the mutual recognition passport to all 
types of trading venues rather than just select regulated markets. By doing 
so, the MiFID removed the main barrier to the development of competing 
trading platforms. 
The MiFID also avoids the linking of regulatory duties with market 
operations. An example of this is the MiFID’s more flexible definition of 
best execution.161 Under the MiFID, trading platforms are permitted to 
tailor their services according to the sophistication of the investor. 
Therefore, trading markets have the flexibility to offer services beyond best 
price to institutional investors, while retail customers still retain the 
protection of best price. Finally, the mutual recognition passport opened the 
EU member states to exchanges from other EU member states, allowing 
various European exchanges to place trading screens and offering services 
directly to investors across Europe. This openness made it possible for 
exchanges to compete head-to-head for listings and order flow.162 This in 
turn has encouraged the consolidation of European exchanges and the 
competitive innovations noted above. 
The MiFID further offers a blueprint for a mutual recognition regime 
between the United States and other jurisdictions. The model is the passport 
concept set forth by the MiFID. In addition to mutual recognition, the 
passport requires agreement on minimum standards and home country 
supervision. For there to be minimum standards, there must be 
harmonization of certain regulatory standards to ensure that all trading 
markets satisfy and meet the same basic requirements. Only once these 
minimum standards are set will it be possible to have home-country 
supervision. This illustrates the need for a robust mechanism for regulatory 
coordination. The Lamfalussy process offers one example of how 
institutional links can be set up to provide information sharing and joint 
rule-making. In this respect, the MiFID passport reflects many decades of 
experience by the European Union, where aspirations for mutual 
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recognition have been foiled by inconsistent implementation of directives 
and imposition of special requirements by certain member states. The 
United States should respect this experience and consider the approach laid 
out in the MiFID. 
SUBSTITUTED COMPLIANCE: CHANGE IN COURSE FOR U.S. 
MARKET REGULATION? 
Recently, SEC officials Ethiopis Tafara and Robert Peterson proposed a 
new regulatory framework of “substituted compliance” to allow for foreign 
stock exchanges and broker-dealers to access the U.S. financial market 
without registering with the SEC.163 The Tafara and Peterson article has 
generated a great deal of attention because of the authors’ positions at the 
SEC164 and the general endorsement of the proposal by other senior SEC 
officials.165 
The substituted compliance framework is substantially the same as the 
mutual recognition passport used in the MiFID and the ISD.166 As described 
by Tafara and Peterson, foreign exchanges and broker-dealers would be 
granted an exemption from U.S. regulation, except from the anti-fraud 
provisions of U.S. securities law, if the SEC determines that they are 
adequately regulated by their respective home regulators. The majority of 
the article is devoted to explaining how the SEC would go about 
determining whether foreign securities law and regulation is “substantively 
comparable” to U.S. securities law and regulation and whether the foreign 
regulator has oversight powers and a regulatory and enforcement 
philosophy “substantively similar” to the SEC’s.167 
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According to Tafara and Peterson, the foreign exchange or broker-
dealer must meet certain “exemption requirements” and, at the same time, 
its home jurisdiction must meet certain “regulatory preconditions.”168 To 
ensure that foreign jurisdictions maintain satisfactory regulatory standards 
and oversight, Tafara and Peterson suggest a comprehensive agreement 
between the United States and the foreign country.169 Tafara and Peterson 
rightfully acknowledge a mutual recognition system must require on-going 
monitoring of the foreign jurisdiction. Therefore, they also suggest a 
reassessment of the arrangement every five years.170 Such a reassessment 
period would not be a stick that the United States would use to keep other 
countries in line. Rather, Tafara and Peterson envision that the benefits of 
access to the U.S. market will incentivize foreign countries to improve their 
own regulatory standards.171 
What is striking about the Tafara and Peterson proposal is the degree to 
which it borrows concepts from the MiFID and the regulatory approach of 
the European Union. At the same time, the Tafara and Peterson proposal 
falls short. It fails to note that the United States would need to modify its 
own regulations to be more consistent with foreign regulatory systems. For 
example, the separation of stock exchanges’ business operations from their 
self-regulatory activities and the broadening of acceptable execution criteria 
under the trade-through rule would need to be addressed. 
Furthermore, the Tafara and Peterson proposal is vague about the 
institutional links that must be established between the SEC and foreign 
regulators. The authors are too modest to suggest that the SEC join, by 
treaty, CESR or some other multilateral regulatory body172 where the 
members are legally obligated to implement any joint decisions or enter into 
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http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD126.pdf). It is puzzling why the authors 
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an international legal regime where the rulemaking or legal interpretation 
happens at the international level.173 It is more realistic to expect that the 
SEC will not be able to dictate what standards must be maintained by other 
countries, but rather will be forced to negotiate and compromise on 
comparable standards. It is important to note that foreign markets may not 
decide that market access to the United States is a vital objective, and, as 
Tafara and Peterson themselves acknowledge, their proposal is driven in 
part by the willingness of U.S. investors to go abroad and shed the 
protections afforded by U.S. law.174 
Additionally, the bilateral agreement program suggested by Tafara and 
Peterson will most likely not offer the flexibility required to regulate the 
fast-moving securities markets. International agreements are difficult to 
draft and negotiate. It is difficult to imagine drafting and negotiating the 
terms of an agreement specifying the details of how a country regulates its 
exchanges and broker-dealers. Agreements, if the parties make them 
binding, also share an unfortunate characteristic with EU directives in that 
they will most likely not be self-executing and must be implemented into 
national law and regulation. The European Union learned quite painfully 
that inconsistent implementation of directives undermines the directives’ 
objectives.175 Similarly, there is a likely chance that the treaties will offer 
little comfort to the SEC that the foreign securities law and regulation is 
“substantively comparable” to U.S. securities law and regulation, and that a 
given foreign regulator has oversight powers and a regulatory and 
enforcement philosophy “substantively similar” to that of the SEC. 
The solution is to establish an international body that will serve as a 
focal point for regulatory coordination. This body will be based on treaty 
law, and its decisions enforced on participating countries. In short, there 
needs to be a CESR-like entity that can provide the institutional links 
necessary to implement technical regulation and monitor enforcement 
efforts at the national level.  
CONCLUSION 
The need to re-examine how the SEC regulates exchanges and other 
trading markets is even more apparent in light of recently voiced concerns 
about the competitiveness of the U.S. financial markets.176 In light of these 
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concerns, the task for the SEC should be two-fold: encourage U.S. stock 
exchanges to become more competitive and push for greater convergence of 
regulation with the European Union as well as other major financial 
jurisdictions. The MiFID serves as a model for how the SEC can achieve 
these two goals.  
To accomplish the first goal, the SEC should expose the U.S. stock 
exchanges to greater competition, both from foreign markets and other 
domestic exchanges and ATSs. The SEC should revisit Regulation NMS 
and to allow execution of trades on a variety of criteria other than merely 
price. A trade-through rule focused on best price makes it difficult for new 
trading venues to challenge the dominance of the major stock exchanges 
and ignores the needs of institutional investors. These are the investors most 
likely to look to, and are in the best position to take advantage of, 
marketplaces outside the United States. By revising the trade-through rule, 
the SEC would encourage the further growth of ATSs and regional 
exchanges and increase competitive pressure on the larger stock exchanges 
to innovate and improve their efficiency. 
The SEC also should allow the placement of foreign-market trading 
screens in the United States. The SEC has long resisted the location of 
foreign trading screens in the United States without foreign exchanges first 
becoming registered securities markets under SEC rules. The placement of 
foreign trading screens will make it easier for U.S. investors to buy abroad, 
but any costs may be outweighed by the beneficial effect on U.S. exchanges 
to meet more direct foreign competition. 
At the same time, introducing foreign trading screens will allow U.S. 
exchanges to demand reciprocal treatment in Europe and other jurisdictions. 
As foreign investors become more interested in equity securities, the SEC 
should eliminate the barriers to foreign investors participating in the U.S. 
markets. 
The SEC also needs to push foreign regulations to converge with those 
of the United States. In recognizing that U.S. investors are actively 
participating in the foreign markets, the SEC’s goal should be to bring the 
other markets up to U.S. standards. The SEC can achieve this goal by 
devoting more resources to reaching out to foreign regulatory authorities 
and looking more aggressively for ways to encourage the strengthening of 
foreign rules and regulations. As an incentive to foreign regulators to work 
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with the SEC, the SEC can offer the prospect of establishing mutual 
recognition arrangements where foreign and U.S. companies can participate 
in each other’s capital markets while complying with their home 
jurisdictions’ requirements. Seeking mutual recognition would mark a 
major shift in SEC policy, but is an example of the type of bold policy that 
must be pursued in this changing market environment. 
The goal of such a project would not be to have foreign countries adopt 
U.S. securities laws. Rather, the goal would be to ensure that foreign 
countries adopt the substance of U.S. requirements to provide a level of 
investor protection acceptable to the SEC. The United States must defend 
its position as the leading securities market in the world. To do so, it must 
look outward and embrace the free flow of investor capital across borders 
through open competition and regulatory cooperation. 
